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THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM:





President, Institute for International Monetary Affairs
Special Adviser to the Prime Minister of Japan Keizo Obuchi
I was asked to talk today about the recent Japanese financial situation.  As everyone is
aware, the cracks in Japan’s current financial stability have emerged from the market perception
that Japanese banks have been dangerously weakened by a huge amount of bad loans.  There is
also the perception that neither the Japanese government nor the banks’ managers are taking
adequate measures to improve the situation, particularly against the background of Japan’s
deteriorating macroeconomic condition.
It is certainly true that Japanese banks have not taken decisive steps to clean up their bad
assets, and indeed for many years have hesitated to disclose the true picture of their balance
sheets.  Banks took such incomprehensible actions because, on the one hand, they believed that
business conditions would improve over the course of time thus mitigating the pain of bad loans,
while on the other hand, they very much feared that drastic reform measures might destabilize the
market unnecessarily.  However, the situation has changed significantly since November of last
2year when both Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Securities Company failed, sending
shock waves across the entire Japanese economy.  At that time, the Japanese government and
managers of Japanese banks, forced to face the harsh economic realities, took action to strengthen
the banking system through fundamental legal, institutional and financial restructuring.
Unfortunately, these new efforts have been delayed by political events.  In the elections for
the Upper House of the Diet which took place in July, the government party (LDP) was defeated. 
This outcome complicated matters, making a prompt solution very difficult.  Although the LDP
did enter into negotiations with the opposition parties over what form the new financial
restructuring should take, the two-month process which followed was in many respects a big
political show on both sides.  In essence, five main issues were addressed: 1) measures to deal
with troubled, but survivable banks; 2) measures to deal with failed banks that will not be able to
recover; 3) ways to expedite the disposal of unknown performing loans held by banks; 4) the
appropriate structure for the supervisory organization; and 5) the urgent problem of dealing with
the Long-Term Credit Bank (LTCB) which was on the verge of collapse and in the midst of
negotiating a merger with Sumitomo Trust Bank.  Finally just two days ago, at the end of two
months of negotiations, agreement on these issues was finally reached and draft legislation
designed to implement the reform schemes was submitted to the Diet.  Indeed, today, Friday,
October 2nd, the Lower House is expected to approve those bills and send them to the Upper
House.  The Upper House is likely to clear them in about a week, so by the middle of October the
legislation will be passed.
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and the opposition parties, I understand they are as follows.  First, on the measures to deal with
troubled but survivable banks, conditions covering the injection of public money to support and
supplement the capital base of those banks will be jointly drafted.  Second, failed banks with no
chance of recovery will be either nationalized transitionally until they can be purchased by or
merged with other banks, or they will be legally dissolved under government management or sold
to the so-called “bridge bank,” a government-established public bank.  Third, to expedite the
disposal of unknown performing loans held by banks, a new agency – the Disposal and Collection
Agency – modeled after the American RTC (Resolution Trust Company) will be established. 
Fourth, and the decision most difficult for all concerned, is that the responsibility for dealing with
bank failure and financial crisis management will be, at least for the time being, jointly born by the
Ministry of Finance and the newly created Financial Restoration Committee.  However, the
opposition continues to demand the complete separation of the Ministry of Finance from these
issues in the not too distant future.  Fifth, on the LTCB issue, it was agreed that upon the request
of the LTCB, the government will temporarily nationalize the bank and upon the completion of its
reorganization, sell it to an interested buyer, possibly but not necessarily Sumitomo Trust Bank.
Finally, at the end of what has been a very frustrating and tedious process, I am pleased to
say that we now have in place the legal, institutional, and financial framework through which to
carry out a successful restructuring of the Japanese banking sector.  In other words, at last we are
standing at the starting line.  Of course, the most difficult part of the process -- and that is the
actual implementation of the scheme -- is yet to come.  We should be prepared to be challenged
4by many tough tests in that upcoming process.
There are several tasks for us to undertake in order to make this restructuring process a
success.  One is, of course, to convince the general public, and also the media that a sizeable
amount of public money must be spent.  As you may recall, the government had originally decided
to provide 30 trillion yen, but during the negotiations, there was some reshuffling of this
allocation of funds.  However, regardless of the amount allocated, I am certain that the
government will end up having to spend tens of trillion yen to clear up this mess.  How big the bill
will be depends on how the overall business climate develops in the coming months.
Second, while it is obvious that effective measures are required to secure a continued flow
of bank credit to the private sector thereby avoiding a deflationary impact from bank restructuring
on businesses,  I think this cannot be overstressed.  Already we have seen the serious
consequences in Hokkaido of the unintended collapse of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank last
November.  Indeed, in anticipation of stricter disclosure requirements, banks have already begun
to shed as many loan assets as possible in order to maintain their capital adequacy ratio.  In such
an environment of what might be termed “corporate anorexia,” in which all banks want to reduce
their weight, a serious deflationary impact on the economy is not unlikely.  We must be sure to
take adequate and effective measures to prevent this from happening.
Third, there is a real need to establish an effective market mechanism for facilitating the
disposal of the very large amounts of collateralized assets, mainly property and others.  These are
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including securitization of assets and legal improvements to facilitate disposition.  But how to
expedite the disposal of those collateralized assets will be a crucial element in facilitating the
reduction of bad loans.
Last but not least, it is certain that we need above all, a steady recovery of the overall
economy.  For that purpose, I believe that in addition to what we have done already, we need to
implement further fiscal, monetary, and deregulation policies.  Specifically the only way to avoid 
the deflationary impact of restructuring is to boost the economy by providing new business
opportunities, which can in turn create new employment and new income.  Deregulation is an
important step in that direction.
In terms of the political side of this situation, when the LDP lost control (i.e., the majority)
of the Upper House in the last election, it became absolutely necessary for them to get the support
of at least some opposition parties.  That is why during the negotiation process, the LDP
gradually expanded its concessions to the oppositions’ requests.  And this situation will not be
confined to financial reform legislation.  All other legislation will meet with this same fate.  But
the opposition is also diversified: Peace and Reform, Liberals, Communists, and the leaders, the
Democrats.  This fragmentation creates an opportunity for the LDP to formulate partial alliances
with various opposition parties on different issues.  To some extent, this strategy of partial
alliance worked in the financial reform negotiations.  In  the last stages of the negotiation, the
Peace and Reform party took a more conciliatory posture with the LDP although the liberals
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understood that their strength lies in solidarity, so they tried very hard to stay unified.  Again,
their efforts were successful until the very end of the negotiations, demonstrating the ability of the
opposition parties to maintain at least a core of solidarity among themselves.
It is quite clear that neither the LDP nor the opposition parties wants an early election of
the Lower House.  For the LDP, an early Lower House election would surely mean their loss over
the control of the government.  Although the opposition parties appear somewhat ambivalent, my
guess is that the majority of incumbent politicians do not want to face a Lower House election
soon.  Indeed, taking an even more cynical view, I would venture to say that at least some of the
members of the opposition would prefer not to take control of the government at this very
difficult time.  Rather, they may well prefer to wield the power of d  facto control over
legislation.
I know that Obuchi is not a very popular prime minister, particularly in this country.  But
the simple fact is that under Japan’s system of parliamentary democracy, he was duly elected as
prime minister.  There was no wrong-doing or cheating in that election, and I want to make that
point clear.  Of course whether or not he is a good prime minister is a different matter altogether. 
But he does seem to know his own strengths and weaknesses, and this is a rare quality among
politicians.  This means that on issues which are not his strong suit, Obuchi prefers to let better
players do the job while he remains a sort of stage manager.  Having learned from the mistakes of
his predecessor, Obuchi is also reluctant to demonstrate strong leadership when he does not have
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negotiations, the LDP suffered not only from the lack of a strong command post but also as a lack
of coordination between the group of younger members who actually participated in the
negotiation process and the group of senior party leaders.  Indeed it was the group of younger
LDP members, particularly those from urban electorates so desperate to avoid an early election in
order to keep their positions, who were most willing to make the necessary compromises to reach
agreement with the opposition during the negotiations.
To conclude, several very interesting phenomena have emerged from this recent political
negotiation experience.  One is of course the fact that the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of
Japan were distanced from the core of the negotiations.  Clearly, there is still a very strong feeling
against them both among the opposition and the LDP itself.  But at the same time, I have  sensed
that after sober reflection, politicians, media, and business alike recognize the need for a group of
cool-headed and objective experts capable of leading Japan through this period of crisis.  Because
of the lack of such a group, I am afraid that this entire process of negotiation was made more
difficult than it should have been.
The second interesting phenomenon is the emergence of a new group of young,
hardworking and quite knowledgeable politicians who gained a certain amount of confidence by
being able to bring these difficult negotiations to a successful end.  These younger politicians
emerged in both the LDP and some of the opposition parties.
8It is true that a great sense of uncertainty about Japan’s future stability is shared by LDP
and opposition members alike.  Out of this uncertainty, we can draw several scenarios.  One is the
certain regrouping of political parties, the splitting of the LDP, the splitting of the Democrats, and
the regrouping of the other political parties in one way or another.  A second scenario is a change
in government should the current political leaders fail to deal successfully with any one of a
number of delicate and political issues they face, including the pending U.S.-Japan defense
guideline negotiations, North Korean nuclear issues, and several upcoming visits from heads of
state.  But a third scenario is that the present administration will strengthen its position through
the gradual accumulation of achievements, no matter how poorly these achievements are judged. 
I will conclude by saying that the Japanese government, Prime Minister Obuchi included, is trying
really hard to meet the present challenges, but the future is wide open, and any of the above
political scenarios is possible.
Discussion
Question:Governor Hayami of the Bank of Japan has announced his intention to increase by 50
percent the amount of open market operations.  Mr. Sakakibara, your grandchild at the Ministry
of Finance, has announced that the exchange rate is going to remain where it is.  Those two
policies would strike an outside observer as being incompatible.  So two questions: What is your
judgement about how that incompatibility will be resolved?  And do you think that a modest
devaluation as part of a program of expansion would be beneficial to Japan?
9Gyohten:Both of those propositions – first, trying to supply adequate liquidity, and second
maintaining exchange rate stability – are objectives of the present administration.  Although
theoretically speaking these propositions may be contradictory to each other, when you consider
that the present yen-dollar exchange rate of 130 to 140 may be slightly undervalued, it is no
longer true that greater liquidity and lower interest rates will be incompatible with strengthening
the exchange rate.  While lowering interest rates can certainly lead to weakened exchange rates,
exchange rate markets are actually less affected by monetary policy than they are by more broad-
gauged sentiments of economic well-being or distress.  In reality, then, it may be possible to
achieve both goals simultaneously.  However, I don’t think a devaluation would be very helpful
now because what Japan really needs is not export-led growth but domestic-demand-led growth. 
Also, at present the yen-dollar exchange rate has great significance as a kind of bellweather of the
overall Japanese economic situation.  When the yen weakens, Japanese business takes this as a
sign that economic conditions are deteriorating, and this will have a further adverse impact on
Japanese consumer and investor confidence.  Therefore, taking all of these considerations
together, I for one would prefer to see stabilization of the yen-dollar exchange rate rather than
any further devaluation.
Question:Why has it been so difficult to remove regulatory authority from the Ministry of
Finance?  Is it because of the large number of former MOF officials in the Diet and the LDP, or
were there other considerations?
Gyohten:Even though I cannot speak for the opposition, my guess is that most opposition party
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members are concerned about the wide-spread  resentment among Japanese people against
bureaucrats, particularly MOF bureaucrats.  In fact, many people blame the officials in MOF for
encouraging the inclusive relationship shared between the LDP, business, and the bureaucracy, as
well as the problems of corporate governance this relationship has created.  For the opposition
parties, cutting off MOF from any part of the policy making process is of the utmost importance
as a symbol of their departure from the past.
Question:I have been surprised by the absence in any of the presentations at this conference,
including your own, of two factors that might help the political acceptability of a bank bail out. 
There are two potential winners in a bailout of the banking system, the debtors who no longer
have to pay their debts, and the managers and owners of the banks that are failed but not
removed.  So I ask, are there in fact plans to pursue debtors for the difference between the value
of the loan and the collateral, and to remove the managers as well as the owners of banks that are
intervened?
Gyohten:Those two issues are certainly on our agenda.  I did not mention them not because
they are unimportant but because time was limited.  On your first point regarding follow up and
prosecution of borrowers who get out of paying their debts, efforts are already being made, and
indeed will be enlarged within the newly created agency, to rectify this problem.  One important
issue on the agenda is to strengthen legal measures for implementing this process.  On the
management issue, the so-called moral hazard problems are now very widely discussed.  The
opposition parties in particular are taking a harsh stance against the managers of failing
11
institutions.  I am also certain the Japanese public will not allow those managers off the hook so
easily.
Question:Do you think the situation will come to the point where those implicated in the crisis
will actually go to jail, as did those responsible for the savings and loan crisis in this country?
Gyohten:Well, I certainly cannot predict how many people will be arrested, but I can say that
this issue is becoming increasingly important in Japan.  Of course, whatever happens will be
within the framework of existing laws and will depend on stakeholders demanding appropriate
punishments for those responsible.
Question:When the financial bailout package was passed earlier this year, 13 trillion yen was
allocated for buying preferred shares in existing banks.  Now that entire arrangement seems to
have disappeared from the new agreement.  My question is what alternatives are now available for
providing additional capital to the large banks which are now under even greater pressure due to
the drop in the stock market.  Also, what about the supposed guarantee from several Japanese
government officials that none of the large banks would be allowed to fail?  Is that still
operational or not?
Gyohten:In hindsight, the allocation of that 13 trillion yen had limited effectiveness.  Therefore
that particular scheme is now being replaced by a new concept which more clearly defines the
extent and format of public management based on the financial situation of the individual banks
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concerned.  The most recent idea is to classify troubled banks according to their capital ratio and
that classification will determine the amount of public money which will be injected.
Question:You have drawn a distinction between survivable banks which are going to get public
capital and failed banks which are not.  How does the legislation purport to make that distinction
and do the shareholders in survivable banks walk away with their stake intact or enhanced?
Gyohten:We will draw the line based upon certain financial data, which will become clear after 
official inspection, and also by the institution’s own self-assessment.  In the most serious cases,
the authorities will make a determination that there is no chance for the banks’ survival.  Other 
troubled banks that request public support will be placed under such scrutiny that it will be
difficult for them to pass as less troubled than they really are.  But in neither case should the
managers responsible be allowed to go unpunished.  The fat cats will not be allowed to run away,
and in the end that will be the best lesson for everyone.
